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1 Introduction
As the share of renewable electricity increases worldwide, it will have a growing impact
on electricity system prices and costs. The direct effect of renewables on wholesale prices
(the merit order effect) is typically negative as they provide generation at very low or
zero marginal cost and displace more costly generation. Renewables can also decrease
prices indirectly by lowering market power in systems where generators bid strategically,
as highlighted by Browne et al. (2015) and Ben-Moshe and Rubin (2015). At the same
time, integrating generation that is intermittent and difficult to predict has costs. Plants
with predictable generation have to be ready for back up if there is a sudden drop in wind
or solar production (Currie et al., 2006) and renewables do not easily provide frequency
and voltage control (Romero Martinez and Hughes, 2015; EirGrid and SONI, 2014).
This paper first contributes to the literature evaluating the effect of wind on spot
prices. Second, it adds to the limited literature analysing the effect of wind on balancing
costs, defined as the costs associated with balancing electricity supply with demand in real
time. Third, it evaluates the impact of renewable support on the final cost of electricity
to consumers. Finally, it addresses the impact of storage and interconnection on the effect
of wind, taking advantage of a natural experiment.
The literature on the effect of renewables on electricity prices is vast and growing.
Earlier papers relied on simulations (see e.g. Traber and Kemfert, 2011; Holttinen et al.,
2011; Garcia-Gonzalez et al., 2008; Rehman et al., 2015). Since renewable penetration
has grown, papers have started measuring the effect of renewables using historical data
(Wu¨rzburg et al., 2013; Cludius et al., 2014, for Germany and Austria) (Gelabert et al.,
2011; Gil et al., 2012, for Spain) (Forrest and MacGill, 2013, for Australia). These studies
use econometric approaches to determine the effect of renewables on electricity prices but
do not analyse balancing markets.
As highlighted by Ciarreta et al. (2014) for the Spanish market and by Munksgaard
and Morthorst (2008) for the Danish market, feed-in tariffs can significantly impact final
consumers’ bills, making wind generation on net costly to consumers. Neither of these
studies include balancing costs in their analysis.
Several papers describe how changes in market design could decrease balancing costs
by incentivising the renewable sources to minimize their forecast errors. Holttinen (2005)
analysed the Nord Pool balancing market, arguing that wind should be balance responsible.
Swinand and Godel (2012) and Bueno-Lorenzo et al. (2013) study how payments could
be imposed on renewable generators to reduce their forecast errors. Batalla-Bejerano and
Trujillo-Baute (2016) estimate the impact of renewable energy on the adjustment service
costs (that include both balancing costs and capacity payments). The authors find a
positive and significant impact of renewable generation (solar and wind) on these costs for
Spain.
We study the Irish Single Electricity Market (SEM), using hourly data from 1 January
2008 to 28 August 2012. The dataset for the island of Ireland is particularly well-suited to
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our analysis. First, extensive data on the system are available from the beginning of the
SEM in November 2007. The compulsory nature of the SEM means that every generator
with a capacity larger than 10MW has to offer electricity on the market. Similarly, all
buyers have to buy from the pool. We are therefore able to base our analysis on complete
system data, which is not possible for jurisdictions where generators and consumers engage
in bilateral contracts outside of the main market. Second, the island has limited intercon-
nection with other systems allowing us to identify the effect of wind more easily. Third, it
has experienced a large increase in wind capacity, more than doubling from about 900MW
at the end of 2007 to almost 2100MW at the end of August 2012, the period chosen for this
analysis. Finally, unexpected and persistent outages at the main storage plant in the SEM
and at the interconnector between the SEM and BETTA provide natural experiments for
the evaluation of the effect of storage and interconnection on system prices both directly
and via their interaction with wind generation.
As expected, we find a negative correlation between the system marginal price (SMP)
and wind generation. When large-scale storage is not available the marginal effect of wind
on the spot price increases at night. When interconnection is not available the effect of
wind decreases for a few hours of the day.
On the other hand wind generation is positively correlated with the constraint pay-
ments provided to generators, our measure of balancing costs. The effect of wind on
constraint payments increases when storage is not available. As expected, forecast errors
of both demand and wind increase constraint payments.
Our results show that the overall effect of wind on system prices is positive, as its
dampening effect on marginal prices is stronger than the effect on constraint payments
and the costs associated to the subsidies given to wind generators. When storage is
significantly reduced, the cost of wind on constraint payments more than doubles, but the
net effect of wind generation stays positive. The existence (or absence) of interconnection
has a much weaker effect on wind’s propensity to affect system costs.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 depicts the SEM in more
detail. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 explains our methodology and describes
the estimation of the effect of wind on the system marginal price. Section 5 presents the
results for constraint payments. Section 6 describes the subsidies accorded to wind and
estimates their size while Section 7 concludes.
2 The SEM
The Irish electricity market encompasses the electricity systems of both the Republic of
Ireland and Northern Ireland, making it a cross-jurisdiction, cross-currency system.
The contribution of renewable electricity to overall electricity demand was about 20%
in 2013 for the Republic of Ireland (Dineen et al., 2015) and 19% for Northern Ireland
in 2014 (Department of Enterprise Trade and Investment, 2015). Renewable penetration
in electricity generation is expected to reach 40% by 2020 if the two jurisdictions are to
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meet their renewable energy targets under the European Directive (2009/28/EC) (DETI,
2010; DCENR, 2012).1 The electricity mix in the SEM changed between 2008 to 2012.
Installed wind capacity increased from about 12.5% in 2008 to 18.5% of total generation
capacity (excluding interconnection capacity). Combined-Cycle Gas Turbine generators
(CCGTs) increased their share of capacity from 32.8% in 2008 to 37.7% in 2012. Capacity
of open-cycle gas turbines, natural gas combustion turbines, distillate and oil was 32.6%
of the total in 2008, decreasing to 24.7% in 2012. Coal and peat were 14.5% of the total
capacity installed in 2012, down from 16.9% in 2008. Hydro remained constant during the
period at 3% of total capacity.2
The SEM is a compulsory pool system, where plants bid in the day-ahead market and
are called to generate on the basis of the merit order: plants with lower bids are called
to generate ahead of more expensive plants until total generation equals total demand.
Each plant’s bid reflects its short run marginal costs and includes the cost of fuel and
carbon dioxide emission permits needed to generate a megawatthour (MWh) of electricity,
in addition to operation costs. Generators submit up to 10 price-quantity pairs that apply
to all 48 half hours during a 24-hour period, but can change every 24 hours. The System
Marginal Price (SMP) reflects the bid of the marginal plant, or the cost of generating the
most expensive unit of electricity needed to meet demand.
The regulation authority monitors the market through the market monitoring unit.
Power plants are required to bid their short run marginal cost in line with the bidding
code of practice available from the regulator’s website (http:www.semcommittee.com). As
an additional check of market power there is a system of future contracts in the form of
contracts for differences (CfD). Existing evidence suggests that this regulation is successful,
leading to limited market power (Gorecki, 2013; Market Monitoring Unit, 2009; Walsh
et al., 2016).
In addition to the short-run payments, power plants also receive capacity payments,
designed to cover additional capital costs.
It’s useful to highlight some of the characteristics of the SEM SMP:
• It has never been censored from above, due to the upper bound for the price being
set high (at €1000/MWh) and firms’ bidding behavior being regulated.
• There are no negative prices, despite negative prices being theoretically possible. At
the moment wind companies are price takers and do not therefore bid a price in the
system. Since 2011 they have priority dispatch, in line with EU rules.3
1The Directive is available at (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:
2009:140:0016:0062:en:PDF.
2Information elaborated from SONI and EirGrid reports, including SONI (2008), EirGrid (2008, 2009);
EirGrid and SONI (2010, 2011, 2013b).
3The SEM has always included wind generation when available since it dispatches plants based on
their marginal cost SEM (2011). Priority dispatch of renewables is addressed in article 16 of EU Directive
2009/28/EC and was transposed into law in the Republic of Ireland by Statutory Instrument 147 of 2011
and in Northern Ireland by Statutory Rule 385 of 2012.
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• Electricity consumers do not bid directly in the market, except for a few virtual
plants that can bid in decreases of demand. The SMP is calculated on the basis of
the supply curve (based on the merit order of day-ahead bids from generators) and
actual demand in every period. The SMP is finalised ex post, after actual levels of
demand are verified.
• All bidders and all consumers (represented by suppliers) obtain and pay the same
uniform wholesale price of electricity in every period.
• In the short run electricity demand is not elastic to price, given the limited bidding
on the demand side.
• During our period of analysis the Transmission System Operators (TSO) curtailed
wind if it exceeded 50% of demand at any given time, to ensure system stability, i.e.
voltage and frequency control.4
Table 1: SEM: changes in Bidding Code of Practice, 2007-2012
Date Decision Notes Reference
Nov. 2007 SEM starts
12 Jun. 2008 How to bid Start-up costs should include
cycling; incremental costs
should not. Bids can deviate
from spot price for ’good rea-
son’ (e.g. use it or lose it).
SEM-08-069
18 Dec. 2008 How to include Transmission
and Combined Loss Adj. Fac-
tor (TLAF and CLAF) into
bids
Generators to include loss
factors in price, no-load and
start-up costs.
SEM-11-010;
SEM-11-010a
10 Feb. 2009 Start-up costs Should not depend on plant
status (off versus on).
SEM-09-014
8 Oct. 2010 Exclusion of carbon levy costs
from bids
Gov. tries to recover windfall
gains from free allocation of
CO2 permits.
Modification
of Electricity
Act
23 Feb. 2012 Supreme Court ruling on car-
bon levy costs
Generators can include levy
costs in bids.
1 Mar. 2012 Regulators allow carbon levy
costs in bids
SEM-12-015
May 2012 Modification of Electricity
Act overturned
Carbon levy costs eliminated
from bids.
Bidding rules in the SEM have been modified and clarified over time. Table 1 sum-
marises the main changes to the Bidding Code of Practice. In 2010 the government tried
to recover windfall gains to thermal generators that came from the free allocation of car-
bon dioxide permits. It instituted a ‘carbon levy’ and stated that it could not be included
in bids and therefore passed on to consumers. In 2012 the Supreme Court ruled that
4Since our study period, the system has been accommodating more wind. During the 2014-2015
winter, wind has generated up to 63% of instantaneous demand, see: http://www.eirgrid.com/media/
All-Island_Wind_and_Fuel_Mix_Report_December_2014(2).pdf.
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the carbon levy could be passed onto consumers, causing its repeal within a few months.
During those months generators were allowed to include the cost of carbon twice in their
bids, once for the European Trading System and once for the carbon levy.
We highlight these changes since they may have systematically affected bidding be-
haviour and therefore market prices although, as discussed later, we find no structural
breaks associated with these dates.
3 Data
We build a dataset of hourly information for electricity generation, demand, plant avail-
ability and daily data on fuel and carbon costs from 1 January 2008 to 28 August 2012.
Most of the data on the SEM is downloaded directly from the system operator, SEMO,
with the exception of wind generation and electricity demand. Quarter-hour wind gener-
ation for the Republic of Ireland comes from EirGrid and half-hour wind generation for
Northern Ireland comes from SONI, the system operators of the Republic of Ireland and
Northern Ireland respectively as these sources include both wind farms registered with
the SEM and generation estimates for smaller wind farms not registered with the SEM.
Unregistered wind accounts for 20% to 25% of total wind generation, during the 2008-2012
period.5 We aggregate the series to hourly levels. We also take demand data from EirGrid
and SONI to obtain all-island demand, gross of transmission and distribution losses. We
think it is a better measure of demand than the load variable provided by SEMO. The
SEMO load variable is net of imports and exports to the system, nets demand by the
amount of electricity produced by wind that is not registered directly with SEMO and
includes electricity used by pumped storage.
We also measure wind and demand forecast errors, as they affect constraint payments.
We define the forecast errors as actual levels minus the day-ahead expected value. The
day-ahead expected value is only available from SEMO and therefore refers to wind farms
registered with SEMO and the SEMO definition of load. This is not a big problem for
the wind forecast error, as the correlation between the wind reported in SEMO and the
series built from EirGrid and SONI data is 0.996. The day-ahead information for wind
is available from 6 a.m. on 1 January 2009, leading to 8766 fewer observations. Over
the years there are another approximately 200 observations missing, for a final 31,843
observations. The day-ahead information on load is available from 1 November 2009 at 6
a.m., leading to 16,036 fewer observations for the demand forecast error. The correlation
between SEMO’s load variable and the demand built using EirGrid and SONI information
is 0.986 from 1 November 2009 to 28 August 2012. While still high, the differences could
be systematic, leading to estimate differences (see Di Cosmo and Malaguzzi Valeri, 2014).
We limit this concern by including forecast errors (i.e. changes in the variables) rather
than forecasts in levels.
5We obtain this estimate by comparing wind generation of the wind farms registered with SEMO with
total wind generation estimated by EirGrid and SONI.
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For all series we have to decide how to address the time changes associated with
Daylight Saving Time. For the spring change in time we set the values for 1 a.m. equal to
their level the prior hour. For the autumn, we eliminate the additional hour that occurs
when moving the clock back.
Information on prices comes from Datastream. Specifically, coal prices are represented
by the API2 price traded on the London market, converted in euro using daily exchange
rates also from Datastream. Gas prices are from the UK hub (NBP). Carbon dioxide prices
are spot prices, taken from BlueNext (www.bluenext.eu). In cases where Bluenext values
are missing, they are supplemented with carbon spot prices from Reuters. All information
on prices is on a daily basis. Since fuel and carbon dioxide permits are not traded on
weekends, we set their weekend value equal to the previous Friday’s level.
Table 2: Summary statistics, 1 Jan 2008- 28 Aug 2012
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SMP (€/MWh) 40842 60.18 32.85 0.00 695.79
Demand (MW ) 40842 4060.56 885.12 2163.78 6773.67
Wind (MW ) 40842 447.43 370.15 1.68 1833.22
Cap.Margin 40842 3033.89 914.43 228.78 5716.73
Gast−24 (€/MWh) 40824 19.65 5.81 4.57 31.78
Coalt−24 (€/MWh) 40824 4.36 1.18 2.48 8.11
Brentt−24 (€/MWh) 40824 42.47 10.88 17.12 62.14
Constraint payments (€) 40820 19030.94 13722.37 -37482.20 210321.00
WindFE(MW ) 31844 -168.52 168.82 -1081.34 282.19
DemandFE(MW ) 24689 -167.60 193.53 -1309.60 732.96
Table 2 reports summary statistics for our dataset, based on hourly data. Wind
generation represents 11% of demand on average in the data.
We check the stationarity of the price series. If the SMP series were non-stationary, the
estimated coefficients in our analysis could be picking up a spurious relation between the
SMP and other regressors, due to a potentially common trend over time. In our case, the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test rejects the hypothesis of unit root in our endogenous
variable, the SMP, at the 1% level.6 The Im-Pesaran-Shin test for panel data (Im et al.
2003) rejects the null hypothesis of unit root in our endogenous variables at the 1% level,
confirming that the series is stationary.7 We therefore analyse the relation between the
system marginal price and its possible determinants in levels.
Fig.1 shows how the SMP and the main fuel prices used in electricity generation change
over time. The SMP series displays a downturn at the beginning of 2009, following the
collapse of oil (and gas) prices in the summer of 2008. However, neither the Clemente
et al. (1998) test nor the Chow test find evidence of structural breaks in the SMP.8
6The associated test statistic is equal to -101.245, with the 1% critical value equal to -3.430.
7The χ2 associated to the statistic is equal to -23.46, with a test statistic equal to -1.920.
8The Clemente and Rao Test rejects the presence of structural break with a t-statistic equal to -32.607,
7
Figure 1: System marginal price and generation fuels, January 2008-August 2012, €/MWh
Source: SMP - SEMO (hourly); fuel prices lagged 24 hours: Bloomberg
The SMP follows the price of natural gas. Natural gas plants, or more specifically
Combined Cycle Gas Turbine plants (CCGT), are frequently the marginal plant, there-
fore setting the SMP. Differences between SMP and natural gas prices are due to losses
during conversion of energy, transport, operation and maintenance costs, the cost of carbon
emission permits and the cost of turning plants on and off.
We also test potential breaks in the SMP series for the dates associated with SEM rule
changes, highlights in Table 1, but the Clemente and Rao tests for structural breaks show
no effect for these dates.
Figure 2 shows how prices and demand vary by hour over the average week. The
largest variation is by time of day, although weekends display lower demand and lower
prices.
with a critical value equal to -4.270. The Chow test verifies that all the variables in our model do not
change significantly before and after the potential structural break. We also investigated whether single
hours have structural breaks. The Chow tests rejected this hypothesis for all the hours. Results of the
tests are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 2: SMP and demand by day of week and hour of day, 1 Jan 2008- 28 Aug 2012
(a) SMP,(€/MWh) (b) Demand,(MWh)
4 System marginal price: model and results
4.1 Estimation
Wind generates electricity at a low marginal price, since wind itself is free. As the amount
of wind generation increases, we expect it to dampen the system marginal price. In this
section we measure the extent of this effect and explore if it varies nonlinearly with wind.
Generators bid for blocks of 24 hours. Ha¨rdle and Tru¨ck (2010), Huisman et al. (2007),
Guthrie and Videbeck (2007) and Weron (2008) show that in an electricity system with
day-ahead bidding, hourly prices can be considered as separate contracts stipulated during
the same day. Maciejowska (2014) highlights the importance of allowing flexibility in
the specification of the spot price response to fuel price shocks, since the effect varies
during peak and off-peak hours. Considering the hourly prices separately allows a flexible
specification, where the impact of demand, wind and the other relevant variables can
vary during the different hours of the day. This does not mean that prices in one hour
can be analysed independently from those in adjacent hours as prices across hours will be
correlated. We estimate the SMP regression as a system of seemingly unrelated regressions
(SUR), as proposed by Zellner (1962), with one equation per hour of the day and residuals
correlated across the hours of the day.
We identify the effect of wind generation W on prices P by taking advantage of the
hourly information on wind generation and SMP. We rely on the high variability of wind,
demand and net imports, which jointly determine how much electricity is generated in
each hour. We assume that demand L is exogenous, which is reasonable in this market
where demand is highly inelastic to price (in part because retail prices do not vary at high
frequency) and demand varies substantially during the day. This implies that in practice
we do not have to worry about simultaneity problems.
We do however have to represent supply-side effects carefully. Some supply-side vari-
ables affect the marginal price directly, for example the fuel prices. We include the price
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of natural gas and the cost of CO2 emission permits, represented by F j , where j indexes
the type of price. Other variables affect the price through the merit order, for example
the level of plant outages and net imports.
Net imports (I) can be considered exogenous in our analysis: transmission rights to
trade power along the Moyle interconnector are acquired ahead of time during our period
of analysis. Moreover, McInerney and Bunn (2013) show that interconnector flows do
not respond to contemporaneous electricity prices. The capacity margin mar measures
the effect of both forced and unforced outages. It is defined as the difference between
available capacity in every period (excluding wind, which is not predictable) and demand.
The more plants are available relative to demand (the larger the capacity margin mar),
the lower the system price, as cheaper plants will enter the merit order. We also measure
specific outages. During the study period the pumped storage plant, Turlough Hill, and the
interconnector between Northern Ireland and Scotland, Moyle, were on extended outages,
especially in 2011. Pumped storage is a very flexible generation technology that does not
actively bid in the market and is often used to balance the system and might be used
to compensate for wind fluctuations (Meibom et al., 2011). Without pumped storage,
the system operator has to rely more on other plants to balance supply with demand,
potentially changing wind’s effect on the SMP. We include dummies to account for the
outages of the Moyle interconnector and Turlough Hill and their interaction with wind.
The dummy variables Ds account for several factors. For three months in 2012 (from
the 27th of February to the 25th of May) generators were allowed to double the level of
CO2 prices in their bids (for details see Table 1). We control for the higher prices during
this period by including a CO2fee dummy variable. Finally, the long period of our analysis
(4 years) means that we have to control for other aspects of the market that change over
time, including the commissioning or decommissioning of plants and regulatory changes,
although on the latter see the discussion of Table 1.
For every hour i, we wish to estimate the following equation:
Pi,d = αi +
3∑
h
[βhi Lhi,d + γhi W hi,d + θhimari,d] +
∑
j
ζji F
j
i,d−1 +
∑
s
κsDsi + χIi,d + i,d (1)
We are not interested in the coefficients for the month-year dummy variables, so we
transform Eq.(1) by taking the difference of the variables with respect to their month-year
mean. This allows us to estimate the following system of equations (where the constant
has also been differenced out), where each variable is defined as the difference of its levels
from its month-year mean:
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
P1,d =
3∑
h
[βh1Lh1,d + γh1W h1,d + θh1marh1,d] +
∑
j
ζj1F
j
1,d−1 +
∑
s
κsDs1 + χI1,d + 1,d
...
Pi,d =
3∑
h
[βhi Lhi,d + γhi W hi,d + θhimari,d] +
∑
j
ζji F
j
i,d−1 +
∑
s
κsDsi + χIi,d + i,d
...
Pn,d =
3∑
h
[βhnLhn,d + γhnW hn,d + θhnmarn,d] +
∑
j
ζjnF
j
n,d−1 +
∑
s
κsDsn + χIn,d + n,d
(2)
where: corr(i,d, −i,d) 6= 0; corr(i,d, i,d−1) 6= 0;  ∼ N(µ, σ2V ) and V is the variance-
covariance matrix.
There are n = 24 equations in the system, one for every hour of the day, with i
indexing hours and d days. We allow wind, demand and capacity margin to have a flexible
specification by including them in levels, squared and cubed (h =1-3). We expect the
system price to be affected more than proportionally by changes in demand when demand
is already high, because significantly more expensive plants may enter the merit order.
The opposite holds for high wind levels, as we expect higher levels of wind to affect the
system price less.
Cross-sectional dependence is a problem in macro panels with long time series (Baltagi,
2008). Ignoring possible correlations of regression disturbances over time and between
subjects can lead to biased coefficients. We test for the presence of heteroscedasticity in
the residuals in Eq. (2) with the Breusch-Pagan test, a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test.
We reject the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity between the residuals, with a χ2
equal to 21114 and an associated p-value of 0. We therefore use robust standard errors.
We follow the methodology proposed by Zellner (1962) to account for the correlation
between the residuals of each equation and use a two step procedure. In the first step, the
system of equations described by Eq (2) is estimated by OLS. The second step estimates
the parameters of the system using Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS), with the
variance-covariance matrix estimated in the first step.
We also test for the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals within each equation,
possible as the T dimension of our system is quite high (we have 1460 observations for each
hour). Using the xtserial test suggested by Wooldridge (2002) we reject the null hypoth-
esis of no autocorrelation between the residuals and model the system with autocorrelation
in the error term to avoid underestimating the standard errors of the coefficients.9 The
autocorrelation is accounted for by implementing a Prais-Winsten transformation with
FGLS.10 As a robustness check, we estimate Eq. (2) with a time-series approach. We use
9The Wooldridge test to detect autocorrelation of residuals is based on a model estimated in first
differences. In this model, the underlying assumption tested is that cov(∆j,d,∆j,d−1) = −0.5. The χ2
associated with the statistic is equal to 55.67. A detailed explanation of the xtserial test implemented
by STATA is available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/116069/2/sjart_st0039.pdf.
10The autocorrelated process of the residuals means that the estimation in levels with month-year dummy
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the ADF and the PAC of the residuals to determine the appropriate correlation structure
of the model. This analysis highlights that the residuals are both correlated between hours
and days. In particular, we find that the first 5 hours of the residuals are autocorrelated, as
well as the hours 22 to 26. The results of this specification are reported in the Appendix.
4.2 Estimation: results
Results for a subset of hours are shown in Table 3. Complete results for all the hours are
reported in Table A1. All energy is expressed in GWh for ease of reporting.
Table 3 shows a significant and negative effect of wind generation on the system
marginal price, as expected. The effect is larger during the day than at night, as it
displaces more expensive plants during the day.
In the SEM, day-time peak demand occurs between 10 a.m. and 12 p.m. and the
evening peak is between 5 and 7 p.m. (corresponding to hours 17 to 19 in our analysis).
The evening peak is the overall daily peak in the winter, whereas the day-time peak is the
daily peak during summer months.
The coefficients on the square and cube wind term are both significant for several hours,
including during early morning hours, confirming that the effect of wind is non-linear, at
least for a few hours of the day.
The outage at Turlough Hill increases the effect of wind on the SMP at night, possibly
because wind generation cannot be used to pump water back up to the upper storage. Ex-
tended outages at the Moyle interconnector do not impact wind’s effect at night, whereas
they decrease the effect of wind for a few hours during the day.
Full results are in the appendix in Table A1. Other variables behave as expected.
Demand has a generally positive effect on SMP and has a distinct non-linear effect. The
price of natural gas is positively related to electricity prices. The capacity margin has
negative effect on SMP: when demand decreases or more generation is available, electricity
prices tend to be lower all else being equal.
variables and the estimation in first differences from the month-year mean are not identical. The AR(1)
process involves lagging all explanatory variables. Since dummy variables do not appear explicitly in the
differenced version, they are not lagged in the AR(1) adjustment. In practice the difference between the
estimates is small.
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Table 3: Effect of wind on the SMP, 1 January 2008- 28 August 2012
Wind Wind2 Wind3 THOut MoyleOut Wind*Moyle Wind*TH
1 0.86 -12.69** 6.32** 1.8 1.78 1.76 -1.85
(3.02) (4.77) (2.13) (1.43) (2.59) (1.69) (1.29)
2 3.53 -16.54** 7.85** 2.25 1.08 2.04 -4.88***
(3.50) (5.69) (2.63) (1.48) (2.83) (1.96) (1.47)
3 6.67* -28.39*** 14.44*** 2.19 1.27 -1.42 -6.73***
(3.16) (5.11) (2.40) (1.66) (2.99) (1.97) (1.45)
4 13.99*** -45.42*** 23.09*** 3.28 0.67 -1.54 -9.72***
(3.40) (5.65) (2.75) (1.76) (3.22) (2.18) (1.55)
5 15.35*** -48.53*** 24.75*** 3.43 2.65 -1.91 -10.53***
(3.51) (5.89) (2.90) (1.78) (3.23) (2.28) (1.59)
6 14.84*** -44.91*** 22.32*** 2.83 0.91 -2.11 -10.86***
(4.40) (7.64) (3.84) (1.94) (3.50) (2.66) (1.84)
7 -5.77 -7.23 4.83 -1.03 1.49 0.4 -0.46
(8.89) (15.91) (7.97) (3.00) (5.45) (4.48) (3.27)
8 -7.53 -3.04 2.13 1.04 0.29 2.67 -0.63
(4.34) (7.46) (3.55) (1.65) (3.14) (2.26) (1.70)
9 -24.71** 20.03 -7.91 -0.38 -4.19 7.5 0.63
(9.32) (15.76) (7.32) (3.45) (6.74) (4.93) (3.65)
10 -20.51* 1.56 1.16 -3.91 -10.86 5.58 0.54
(9.39) (15.62) (7.13) (3.44) (6.88) (4.96) (3.67)
11 -30.62*** 13.81 -4.15 -1.83 -11.41 6.43 3.22
(7.65) (12.45) (5.59) (2.88) (5.88) (4.02) (2.97)
12 -43.96*** 31.67* -8.64 -4.8 -13.42 8.5 -4.4
(9.95) (15.95) (7.08) (3.81) (7.86) (5.12) (3.74)
13 -57.31*** 45.72* -11.98 -1.15 -28.55** 16.66** -8.82*
(12.20) (19.50) (8.60) (4.71) (9.17) (6.16) (4.43)
14 -28.08*** 7 3.52 -5.48* -8.95 8.92* -3.53
(7.00) (10.99) (4.79) (2.64) (5.84) (3.69) (2.53)
15 -29.40*** 18.94** -6.75* -1.77 -5.51 7.90** 1.92
(4.75) (7.34) (3.18) (1.61) (4.34) (2.62) (1.71)
16 -28.67*** 18.36* -6.54 -3.02 -5.49 7.06** 2.19
(4.99) (7.75) (3.39) (1.67) (4.39) (2.73) (1.77)
17 -14.04 -13.27 8.99 -0.86 2.36 -1.05 0.78
(8.12) (12.81) (5.63) (3.06) (6.45) (4.25) (2.91)
18 4.37 -76.11* 34.82** -0.51 14.64 -20.09* 8.79
(18.88) (29.79) (13.05) (7.98) (17.02) (9.89) (7.09)
19 -26.77 -6.96 6.46 15.31* -21.3 -7.75 -12.66*
(15.18) (24.11) (10.59) (6.36) (12.93) (7.80) (5.74)
20 -40.68** 14.66 -2.14 -11.74 -17.51 -9.19 -7.15
(14.42) (23.02) (10.15) (6.26) (13.77) (7.37) (5.59)
21 -38.57*** 28.49 -11.24 -6.66 -15.92 2.65 1.26
(11.26) (18.30) (8.18) (4.59) (8.99) (5.66) (4.29)
22 -18.72* 4.7 -0.8 1.28 1.99 0.88 2.07
(8.23) (13.40) (5.99) (3.32) (6.43) (4.10) (3.13)
23 -17.69*** 10.93 -3.18 -0.31 2.77 0.65 1.32
(5.18) (8.45) (3.79) (2.03) (3.91) (2.59) (1.95)
24 -10.29* 4.67 -1.94 -0.77 1.06 2.44 0.84
(4.54) (7.47) (3.41) (1.81) (3.43) (2.29) (1.71)
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes all variables listed in Equation 2. Wind is measured in GWh.
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4.3 Marginal Effects
We calculate the marginal effect to assess the overall impact of wind, demand and capacity
margin on the system marginal price and compare our results to papers that do not analyse
the relations separately for each hour or model the relations as linear.
Equation 3 summarises the calculation:
Marginal Effecti = αi + 2βii¯+ 3γ2i i¯2 + δw · ¯TH · Iw + ζw · M¯ · Iw (3)
where i is the variable of interest (wind, demand or capacity margin), i¯ is its mean value;
α is the coefficient of the variable in the linear form (i.e.Wind), β is the coefficient of
the quadratic term, and γ is the coefficient of the cube. For wind, we also include in
the marginal effects of the interaction between the dummies for Moyle and Turlough Hill
outages, with Iw equal to 1 when i is wind and 0 otherwise.
The standard errors of the marginal effects in Table 4 are calculated using the delta
method.11 Significance of the hourly marginal effects reflects the joint significance of
the linear, squared and cubic approximation of the considered variables (wind, loads,
and capacity margin), which may differ from the significance of the variables considered
separately in Table 3. The coefficient of the marginal effect of wind on the SMP, averaged
over the 24 hours, is equal to -17.25. When the average is weighted by the level of
average demand for each hour, the average is -18.17. For every MWh increase in wind
generation (equal to about 0.2% of the average wind generation in our sample) the system
marginal price decreases by €0.018/MWh, or about 0.03% of its average value in our
sample, equivalent to an elasticity of -0.13 calculated at the mean. At the demand average
of 4061MWh, this corresponds to an average reduction of total wholesale costs equal to
€73.78.
We replicate the analysis for the period starting on 1 November 2009, to be consistent
with the results we find for constraint payments (where the dataset is shorter). This leads
to a demand-weighted average effect of 1MWh of wind equal to €-15.37. The average
hourly demand for this period is 4014MWh, leading to a total reduction in average hourly
costs of €61.68 per MWh of wind for the period.
11This is implemented with the STATA12 lincom command. The delta method takes the first order
Taylor approximation of the mean of the considered variables, and then calculates their variance.
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Table 4: Marginal effects, 1 Jan 2008-28 Aug 2012
Hour Wind Loads Cap.Margin
1 -7.216*** 3.644*** 1.648**
(0.78) (1.22) (0.65)
2 -8.213*** 6.116*** 1.326*
(0.89) (1.49) (0.71)
3 -12.515*** 6.099*** -0.028
(0.85) (1.39) (0.67)
4 -15.892*** 8.424*** -0.162
(0.91) (1.51) (0.71)
5 -16.489*** 8.954*** -0.491
(0.94) (1.5) (0.7)
6 -15.428*** 11.343*** -0.967
(1.12) (1.67) (0.82)
7 -9.437*** 4.072* -4.993***
(2.11) (2.45) (1.46)
8 -8.986*** 8.598*** -3.468***
(1.08) (0.96) (0.85)
9 -11.039*** 11.888*** -4.663**
(2.34) (2.1) (2.01)
10 -17.784*** 6.887*** -10.62***
(2.36) (2.16) (1.97)
11 -18.808*** 5.017*** -10.127***
(1.92) (1.85) (1.6)
12 -21.167*** -0.322 -14.613***
(2.47) (2.56) (2.08)
13 -23.826*** -10.049*** -18.73***
(3.03) (3.19) (2.45)
14 -19.337*** -3.875* -10.253***
(1.76) (2.03) (1.49)
15 -14.14*** 6.487*** -7.959***
(1.21) (1.36) (1.05)
16 -13.837*** 7.499*** -7.741***
(1.25) (1.32) (1.09)
17 -20.347*** 14.276*** -9.667***
(1.99) (1.97) (1.72)
18 -42.702*** 42.714*** -20.636***
(4.61) (4.92) (4.41)
19 -34.94*** 35.443*** -8.537**
(3.66) (3.89) (3.45)
20 -32.433*** 29.67*** -11.722***
(3.5) (4.1) (3.58)
21 -19.206*** 19.641*** -6.897***
(2.71) (2.83) (2.5)
22 -14.124*** 6.956*** -7.449***
(1.98) (2.13) (1.78)
23 -9.353*** 0.405 -4.378***
(1.24) (1.5) (1.04)
24 -6.75*** 1.934 -0.738
(1.1) (1.47) (0.9)
Average -17.249 10.943 -8.394
Load weighted average -18.169 10.136 -7.501
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All reported variables measured in GWh.
Averages calculated on marginal effects significantly different from 0 at the 10% level.
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of wind on SMP, €/GWh of wind
The no storage and no interconnection scenarios set the relevant outage dummy to 1.
Figure 3 shows how the marginal effect of wind on the SMP would change if we assumed
that the pumped storage plant and the interconnector were on outage for the whole period
of analysis. To calculate the effect of wind in this scenario we set the Turlough Hill (Moyle
interconnector) outage dummy to 1 and consider all other variables at their hourly average.
The demand-weighted average effect of 1MWh of wind when the pumped storage plant
is on outage is €-18.67/GWh and when the interconnector is on outage is €-17.28/GWh.
These are similar to the -18.17 shown in Table 4. There are however some changes in the
hourly effects. Without storage, the effect of wind during early morning hours is stronger.
These are times when wind tends to blow more. In the absence of storage, the additional
wind cannot be used to pump water up to the upper basin. During the day, the pattern
without interconnection shows a weaker effect of wind on the SMP perhaps because on
average the interconnection flow is displacing less expensive rather than more expensive
generation in the SMP during the day, so in the absence of interconnection the SMP is
smaller and the effect of wind is also smaller.
Figure 4 shows how these results compare to a few recent estimates for the effect of
wind on spot prices. For each paper, we calculate the implied percentage change in spot
price due to a 1MWh increase in wind generation and present its absolute value (all papers
estimate a negative relation between wind generation and spot price change). We caution
that comparing across studies is difficult, given differences in market design, generation
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mix and estimation strategies. In particular, not all transactions occur in the spot market
in some jurisdictions (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands). Moreover some jurisdictions
display a concurrent increase in solar generation, which may depress spot prices on its own
in addition to limiting wind’s impact. In the SEM during this period there was essentially
no solar power, which is also true for the Netherlands. In Germany solar generation
increased from 1% to 5% in the 2008-2012 period. In Italy the solar share increased even
more, going from essentially 0 to more than 6% of demand. Finally, markets in continental
Europe are more interconnected, which may affect the impact of wind generation.
Figure 4: % spot price change with 1MWh increase in wind generation
Table C3 in the Appendix reports the underlying data.
DE=Germany; IE=Ireland; IT=Italy; NL=Netherlands.
We can make 2 observations. First, our estimates (red diamonds) are the largest in
absolute terms. Second, within each study (country) the size of the effect tends to decrease
over time as wind penetration increases, suggesting a non-linear and decreasing impact of
wind generation. Our result is slightly higher than the value found for Ireland by Swinand
and O’Mahoney (2015), which uses a different specification and approach. 12
For a review of both simulation and econometric studies (prior to 2011) see Gelabert
et al. (2011).
12In particular, it focuses on wind in the Republic of Ireland alone, use a different All-Ireland demand
variable, includes the wind forecast error as a determinant of the spot price and uses a different specification.
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5 Constraint payments: model and results
In the SEM, initial dispatch is determined in the day ahead and is based on the day-ahead
bids, forecast wind, demand and plant availability and a simplified representation of gen-
erators’ technical constraints. It abstracts from transmission and distribution constraints.
There are four main reasons why actual dispatch may differ from the day-ahead plans
and give rise to constraint payments. First, system operators do not have perfect foresight.
There will therefore be real-time adjustments to account for unexpected changes in supply
or demand, for example when capacity is not able to deliver. Second, in the presence of
transmission constraints, some plants will have to generate less and others more than
the market schedule to avoid surcharging transmission and distribution lines. Third, the
system operator has to meet other system constraints, for example the maintenance of
voltage and frequency stability throughout the system, which may change which plants
actually generate. Finally, the cost-minimizing algorithm in the day-ahead market does
not take into account all possible technical characteristics of the generators, whereas during
actual dispatch the TSOs (and generators) are meeting all the technical requirements.
Constraint payments in the SEM have been growing over time, as shown in Figure 5,
from about 4% of system costs in 2008, calculated as the sum of the system marginal price
times demand, constraint payments and capacity payments, to 6% in 2011 before falling
back to 5% in 2012.
Figure 5: Constraint Payments as percentage of total system costs, 2008-2012
Total System Costs are: TSC=Constraint Payments+Capacity payments+SMP ·Demand
5.1 Constraint payments: model
In this section we explore the effect of wind generation on constraint payments. We have
to control for several factors: the increase in constraint payments could be in part due to
the outage of the Turlough Hill power plant. Operation of the pumped storage plant is
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particularly relevant to this analysis, since it is used heavily to compensate for short-run
imbalances in the system. The interconnector is also at times used by system operators to
balance demand, although most of the evidence suggests that the Moyle interconnector is
not used to optimise short-run operations (McInerney and Bunn, 2013).
The determinants of constraint payments CP at time t would ideally include indicators
for transmission constraints TC, forced outages at predictable generation plants (such as
thermal plants) ForOut, wind and demand forecast errors and underlying fuel prices Pt.
CPt = f(TCt, ForOutt,WindFEt, DemandFEt,Pt) (4)
Unfortunately, we do not have detailed information for all the explanatory variables in
Equation 4. We are unable to account directly for transmission constraints, although we
know that some plants are constrained on to avoid chronic transmission constraints that
also affect system stability.13 There are also three main system-wide constraints. The
first is a voltage constraint for the Dublin area involving three plants: Poolbeg combined
cycle, Dublin Bay Power and Huntstown combined cycle. The second is a system inertial
stability constraint, which requires 5 large units on at all times and affects large inflexible
units like the Moneypoint coal power plant. The last constraint requires some plants
(like the CCGT plants at Whitegate and Tynagh) to be kept on as operating reserve.
In order to control for the constraint payments associated with these constraints, which
are independent of wind generation, we set the constraint payments associated with these
particular plants equal to 0 when they are negative (i.e. when the plant was slated to run
but did not because the transmission or system constraint did not take place).
We do not have hourly information on forced outages separately from planned mainte-
nance, but we account for large periods of well-documented forced outages at two plants,
the pumped storage plant at Turlough Hill and the Moyle interconnector.
To model the lack of perfect foresight by the system operator, we include both wind
and demand forecast errors. We focus on the forecast error from the day-ahead market
(24 hours ahead), as it is the most relevant in the case of the SEM. The forecast error
variables are the difference between the actual outturn and the values expected in the
day-ahead market, or xt − xt−24, where x is either wind generation or demand.
Both the demand and the wind forecast errors are asymmetric. Wind is forecasted to
be larger than its actual outturn for 29018 observations (91% of the total), against the 2825
periods when it is forecast to be lower (9% of the cases). Demand is forecasted to be higher
than actual outturn 20335 times (82% of the cases) and lower only 4356 times, or 18% of
the cases. As a result, it appears that the day-ahead market systematically over-estimates
both system demand and wind generation available in the system, as shown in Figure
6. This may result in increasing balancing costs. Mauch et al. (2013) report a similar
asymmetry for US wind forecasts. At times of low wind, forecasts tend to underestimate
13More details available at: http://www.eirgrid.com/media/Power%20System%20Seminar%204.pdf,
pg.52.
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wind generation, whereas the forecasts tend to overestimate wind generation when it
blows strongly, thereby overestimating wind generation on average since the errors are
proportional to the amount of wind.
Figure 6: Duration curve of the forecast errors, 1 Nov 2009- 28 Aug 2012
(a) Wind, (MW) (b) Demand,(MW)
Forecast errors are defined as: FEw,l = Actualw,l − Forecastedw,l
Plants that are constrained down return their unrealised costs to the system, while
keeping the period’s system marginal price. In other words, they keep the inframarginal
rent for every period they were scheduled to run in the day ahead market, but were told
not to run due to system constraints. Plants that are constrained up receive payments for
their costs, but no additional payments. Typically the cheaper plants are scheduled in the
day ahead, so there are positive costs to the system when the dispatch changes.
Over time we expect positive constraint payments to be larger than negative constraint
payments, although in any given period we might observe negative constraint payments,
for example if demand turns out to be lower than expected (some plants will be returning
their unrealised costs and no plants will generate in their place) or wind generation turns
out to be higher than expected as wind’s generation costs are close to zero.
Based on data availability, as discussed above, we measure the effect of wind (and
the associated wind forecast errors) on the size of constraint payments and estimate the
following specification (reported as Model 1 in Table 5), using autocorrelated residuals
to account for system dynamics. Here we also include month-year dummy variables. We
therefore estimate the following equation, where each variable is the first difference from
its month-year mean:
CPt = β1Lt + β2Wt + β3WindFEt + β4DemandFEt
+β5mart + β6Pt + β7Outn +
∑
κsDst + t
(5)
where t =
∑4
i=1 ρii,t +
∑24
i=21 ρii,t.
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CPt are the system constraint payments that arise each hour, calculated as the sum of
each plant’s constraint payments and adjusted for system constraints as discussed earlier;
Lt represents system demand. We expect that the larger the demand, the higher the
probability for congestion on transmission lines and so the larger the constraint payments.
The more wind Wt on the system, the larger the forecast errors and the higher the prob-
ability of congestion, so we expect wind to have a positive effect on constraint payments.
Pt includes the price of natural gas, which is the most frequent marginal fuel, and the
price of carbon dioxide permits. The larger these prices the higher we expect constraint
payments to be. The set of dummy variables D include the outages of the Moyle inter-
connector and the Turlough Hill pumped storage plant and their interaction with wind
generation. When the capacity margin mar is high, there are many plants available to
increase generation. We therefore expect that if the dispatch changes, it will likely be at
lower cost to the system, so we expect the capacity margin to have a negative effect on
constraint payments.
We use the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation graphs to determine that the
first 4 hours and the day ahead residuals are autocorrelated, as well as the hours 21 to 24.
The autocorrelated residuals capture some of the inertia of the system, as it takes plants
a few hours to turn on or shut down.14
5.2 Estimation results
Results for Model 1 in Table 5 shows that neither demand nor capacity margin are signif-
icantly different from zero, suggesting that the tightness of the market is not a significant
driver of constraint payments. Higher natural gas prices are associated with higher con-
straint payments, as expected.
The demand forecast error is significant and positive. When demand in the system is
higher than expected, more plants will need to generate and be paid to match demand. The
coefficient on the wind forecast error is negative: when actual wind generation is higher
than forecasted, constraint payments will be lower. When unexpected wind generation
enters the system it displaces plants with a marginal cost of generation higher than wind.
When the unrealised costs of more expensive plants are returned to the market, they lower
constraint payments. The opposite is true when the wind is lower than forecasted.
14We account for autocorrelation of the residuals using Stata 12’s ARMA command, which uses a
Kalman filter specification. Including an AR specification of the residuals is equivalent to a common factor
specification of the dynamics (see e.g. Greene, 2003, page 609 and following).
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Table 5: Effect on constraint payments(€), 1 Nov. 2009- 28 Aug. 2012
Variable Model1 Model2
Gast−24, €/MWh 388.79∗ 403.78∗
(178.36) (179.29)
Demand, MWh -0.69 -0.71
(0.50) (0.51)
Wind, MWh 2.35∗ 1.82
(0.95) (0.95)
DemandFE 4.00∗∗∗ -
(0.91)
WindFE -4.37∗∗∗ -
(0.74)
WindNegativeFE - -4.82∗∗∗
(0.81)
WindPositiveFE - 3.45
(6.34)
DemandNegativeFE - 2.85∗∗
(0.97)
DemandPositiveFE - 0.23
(2.12)
Tur. Hill Out * Wind.Gen 2.99∗∗∗ 2.99∗∗∗
(0.87) (0.87)
Tur.Hill Outage dummy -2330.10∗ -2281.51∗
(1074.70) (1076.32)
Moyle Outage dummy 819.31 674.89
(1508.58) (1525.64)
Moyle Out * Wind.Gen 0.30 0.38
(0.73) (0.74)
Generation Margin (€/MW) 0.85 0.80
(0.44) (0.44)
CO2 Price, €/tonne 53.92 47.01
(285.09) (287.31)
AR(1) 0.175∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
AR(2) 0.090∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
AR(3) 0.036∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
AR(4) 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
AR(21) 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
AR(22) 0.009∗ 0.010∗
(0.004) (0.004)
AR(23) 0.094∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
AR(24) 0.161∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant 12823.74∗∗∗ 12824.97∗∗∗
(18.73) (19.43)
Observations 24499 24499
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variables are included as deviation from their month-year mean.
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As a robustness check we estimate with model 2, allowing the forecast errors to have
a separate effect if they are negative or positive. Both the demand and the wind forecast
errors are significant only when they are negative (when the realised value is smaller
than the forecast). In this case the coefficient on the demand forecast error is 2.85. The
smaller the realised demand relative to its forecast, the smaller the capacity payments.
The opposite holds for the wind forecast error. The forecast error for wind is equal to
-4.82: when wind generation is smaller than its forecast level capacity payments increase.
The other results remain essentially the same. More wind increases constraint payments,
all else being equal and the outage at the pumped storage plant also increases the effect
of wind on constraint payments.
The analysis shows that wind generation is positively related to constraint payments,
all other things being equal (including the level of wind forecast error). After controlling for
other variables, every MWh of additional wind generation is associated with an increase in
constraints payments of €2.35 in our Model 1 estimation, corresponding to about 0.012%
of hourly constraint payments. This possibly occurs because when wind blows strongly
across the SEM area, there may be transmission and distribution congestion. The wind
series we use in the estimation is net of wind curtailment, but wind curtailment tends to
be associated with periods of high wind generation.15
Finally, Table 5 shows that the outage of the interconnector has no effect on constraint
payments, whereas when Turlough Hill is on outage, constraint payments decrease. This
is counter intuitive. It may be that at times when the pumped storage plant is not on
line, more thermal plants are dispatched in the day-ahead market, leading to a higher
probability that thermal plants are constrained down in the real market. On the other
hand, when Turlough Hill is on outage, wind generation has an effect that is both stronger
in statistical terms and more than twice as large, implying that at these times a MWh of
wind generation increases constraint payments by €5.3.
Batalla-Bejerano and Trujillo-Baute (2016) find that the short run elasticity of the sum
of balancing and capacity payments to renewable generation (wind and solar) in Spain is
between 1% and 5%. Our estimates suggest that a 0.2% increase in wind leads to a 0.012%
increase in constraint payments, for an elasticity of about 5%. When storage is on outage
the elasticity increases to 13%.
6 Wind subsidies
Energy policy in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland includes subsidies
for electricity generated by wind. In Ireland this takes the form of a feed in tariff, called
REFIT, which applies for 15 years to each renewable generator. Northern Ireland uses
15During this period some wind was dispatched down for both system-wide reasons and local grid
congestion, although we are unable to distinguish between the two reasons. For 2012, EirGrid and SONI
(2013a) reports that 2.1%, or 110GWh, were curtailed, similar to the 2.2% and 119GWh curtailed in 2011
(EirGrid and SONI, 2012).
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renewable obligation certificates (ROCs), designed to help the UK meet its renewable
energy targets. These are granted to renewable generators for 20 years.
Wind support in Ireland has changed over time. We calculate the cost of wind support
by calculating the REFIT payments to onshore wind generation during our period of
analysis. The REFIT scheme was introduced in 2006 and provides a guaranteed price to
renewable generators (or suppliers they enter into long term contracts with). The 2006
version of the program, that we focus on here, offered different levels of guaranteed prices,
depending on the size of wind farms. For wind farms with less than 5MW export capacity,
the guaranteed payments were slightly higher, as shown in Table 6.16
Table 6: REFIT guaranteed price, €/MWh (nominal)
Fiscal year Large Wind Small wind
2008 63.739 65.976
2009 66.353 68.681
2010 66.353 68.681
2011 66.353 68.681
2012 68.078 70.467
Small wind has export capacity ≤ 5MW
Source: DCENR
Fiscal year is from 1 Oct. of prior year until 30 Sep.
The REFIT regime provides a fixed payment equal to 15% of the guaranteed price of
electricity for large wind farms, plus a top up if the average yearly price wind generators
receive from the market (equal to the sum of the SMP and capacity payments) is below
the guaranteed price.
The value of REFIT over the whole 2 January 2008 to August 28 2012 period per
MWh of onshore wind is about €15.3/MWh. These payments are passed on to final
consumers through the public service obligation (PSO), assessed by the Commission for
Energy Regulation each fiscal year. Appendix D gives the details on the data and the
calculation of the average REFIT cost per MWh.
ROCs in Northern Ireland work differently. Each renewable generator is assigned a
number of ROCs based on its generation. During our period of analysis, wind generators
in Northern Ireland were allocated 1 ROC per MWh of generation. Companies that supply
electricity to consumers have to buy a minimum share of renewable energy and they can
comply either by turning over an appropriate number of ROCs to the regulatory body
or by paying a buy-out fee for every MWh of renewable generation needed to reach the
minimum level and not covered by ROCs.17 The cost of the ROCs is passed on to final
consumers. Here we consider the buy-out fee as the cost paid by consumers.18 Table 7
16DCENR source accessed July 2016 at http://www.dcenr.gov.ie/energy/SiteCollectionDocuments/
Renewable-Energy/RefitReferencePrices.pdf
17The initial legislation on ROCs in Northern Ireland was passed in 2006 with the Renewables Obligation
Order (Northern Ireland) 2006. Details on ROCs in Northern Ireland can be found at https://www.
economy-ni.gov.uk/articles/northern-ireland-renewables-obligation
18For an explanation of why the buy-out fee is reasonable approximation of the cost of ROCs to con-
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reports the buy-out fee in each fiscal year during the period of our study. It is more than
3.5 times larger than the cost of REFIT per MWh. This is consistent with other analyses
comparing the renewable subsidy costs in the two jurisdictions (Deane et al., 2015) and
may be one of the reasons the UK is moving to a feed-in-tariff support system starting in
2017.
Table 7: Buy-out fee for Northern Ireland ROCs, nominal
£/MWh exchange rate €/MWh
2008/09 35.76 0.9308 38.42
2009/10 37.19 0.8898 41.80
2010/11 36.99 0.8837 41.86
2011/12 38.69 0.8339 46.40
2012/13 40.71 0.8469 48.07
Average 37.87 43.31
Avg. from 2009 38.40 44.53
Source: Ofgem (2012); fiscal year in the UK is from 1 April to 31 March.
Exchange rates for March 31 from www.ecb.europa.eu
This cost should be interpreted as the cost to consumers of an additional MWh of
wind generation, rather than the average cost of wind generation subsidies. Over time
the subsidy expires (after 15 years for REFITs and 20 years for ROCs) whereas the wind
farms may continue generating.
We calculate an average cost of wind subsidies across the two jurisdictions. We im-
plicitly assume that new wind capacity would be located in Northern Ireland and Ireland
according to its historical share, with 80% of wind generation taking place in Ireland and
the remaining 20% in Northern Ireland. A weighted average of the ROC and the RE-
FIT costs to consumers gives an average subsidy equal to 44.53·0.2 + 15.14·0.8 = 21.02,
expressed in €/MWh.
To summarise, for the period starting November 1 2009, an additional MWh of wind
generation increases constraint payments by an estimated €2.35 (or €5.3 when the pumped
storage plant is on outage), but decreases total electricity purchase costs by about €61.68.
Consumers pay an average €21/MWh for this wind, suggesting a positive net effect of
about €38.33/MWh of wind generation, decreasing to €35.38/MWh when storage is not
available.
These results contrast with results for Spain after 2010 (Ciarreta et al., 2014) where
wind reportedly increases net costs to consumers. The average subsidy in Spain is about
€75 per MWh of wind or higher from 2009 onward, which is significantly larger than
both the subsidy in Ireland and in Northern Ireland. Our findings are more aligned
with the results for Denmark between 2000 and 2006 (Munksgaard and Morthorst, 2008).
Munksgaard and Morthorst (2008) state that the subsidy in Denmark decreased from €66
in 2000 to €12 per MWh of wind in 2006, leading to a slight net cost to consumers by
sumers, see for example Bryan et al. (2015).
25
2006 between €3 and €7 per MWh of wind.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyses how wind generation influences the price and constraint payments in
the Irish Single Electricity Market and compares it to the wind subsidy paid by consumers.
To define the impact on the system price, we estimate a system of hourly equations
and find a consistent negative effect of wind. We show that the effect is not linear and is
affected by the presence (or rather, absence) of storage. When Turlough Hill, the largest
storage facility in the SEM, is on outage, the impact of wind on prices increases at night,
possibly because wind cannot be used to pump water back of to the upper storage. Outages
at the interconnector between the island of Ireland and Great Britain lead to a decreased
impact during some hours of the day. We calculate the average effect of wind on prices
and show that a MWh increase in wind generation (equal to about 0.2% of the average
wind generation in our sample) leads to a decrease of the system marginal price equal to
€0.018/MWh, or about 0.03% of its average value in our sample.
Second, we investigate if and how wind affects constraint payments. Our prior is
that larger amounts of wind will lead to higher constraint payments, all else being equal.
This is confirmed by our findings that show that wind generation is positively linked to
constraint payments both directly and through the wind forecast error. The larger the
errors in forecasting the level of wind and demand, the larger the constraint payments. In
periods when storage is unavailable, the impact of wind generation on constraint payments
more than doubles. We find no systematic effect of outages at the interconnector between
the island of Ireland and Great Britain.
Finally, we calculate the cost of subsidies for wind generation, which differ in Northern
Ireland than in Ireland. We calculate a weighted average of the subsidies in the two
jurisdictions to measure the subsidy effect per MWh of wind generation. Once we consider
the cumulative effect of changes in spot price, changes in constraint payments and cost
of subsidies, we conclude that the net effect of wind generation is positive for the SEM
during our period of analysis. When pumped storage is on outage the constraint payments
increase significantly, but the net effect remains positive.
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Appendix A Estimation results
Table A1 below shows results for all estimated hours for estimated equation 2. CO2 price
and CO2 fee (measured in €/tonne) are not presented due to space limitations; complete
results are available from the authors upon request. Wind, demand, capacity margin and
imports are in GWh. Price of gas is in €/MWh.
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Appendix B Robustness check
Table B2 shows the results for the time series estimation. Here again, we take the difference
of the variables from their month-year mean and estimate the following regression:
Pt =
3∑
h
[βhLht + γhW ht + θhmart] +
∑
j
ζjF jt−24 +
∑
s
κsDs + χIt + t (6)
We control for the autocorrelation of the residuals by including lags 1-5 and 22-26,
after verifying the autocorrelation and partial-autocorrelation graphs of the residuals. The
marginal effect of wind on system marginal price is equal to -18.33, which is very close to
the average of the marginal effects found with the panel estimate (-18.17).
The results of the time series estimates do not disentangle the impact of the wind, the
interconnector and the storage during the different hours of the day. The results in Table
3 show that wind generation does not affect the system price homogeneously during the
hours. In particular, wind is particularly significant during the night and the first hours
of the afternoon, and this effect is not captured in the time series specification. Finally,
storage and interconnector are not significant in Table B2, but Table 3 shows that they
are statistically different from zero for several hours of the day.
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Table B2: Effect of wind on SMP (€/MWh), hourly data, 2008-2012
Variables Coeff.
Loads, GWh 167.300∗∗∗
(11.312)
Loads2, GWh -41.403∗∗∗
(2.519)
Loads2, GWh 3.625∗∗∗
(0.184)
Wind Generation, GWh -19.756∗∗∗
(3.011)
Wind2 GWh 2.11
(4.565)
Wind3 GWh 0.825
(1.949)
Gast−24 (€/MWh) 0.414∗
(0.206)
CO2 (€/tonne) 0.222
(0.264)
Net Imports, GWh -23.971∗∗∗
(2.19)
Capacity Margin, GWh -97.157∗∗∗
(3.157)
Cap.Marg.2 GWh 24.136∗∗∗
(1.303)
Cap.Marg.3 GWh -1.959∗∗∗
(0.168)
THOut -1.045
(1.317)
MoyleOut -4.657
(2.872)
Wind*TH -1.898
(1.321)
Wind*Moyle 1.21
(1.394)
AR(1) 0.344∗∗∗
(0.001)
AR(2) 0.044∗∗∗
(0.003)
AR(3) 0.035∗∗∗
(0.004)
AR(4) 0.020∗∗∗
(0.005)
AR(5) 0.023∗∗∗
(0.004)
AR(22) -0.015∗∗∗
(0.004)
AR(23) 0.035∗∗∗
(0.003)
AR(24) 0.281∗∗∗
(0.002)
AR(25) -0.077∗∗∗
(0.003)
AR(26) -0.036∗∗∗
(0.004)
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes CO2fee. 35
Appendix C Comparison with other studies
Table C3: Percent change in spot price associated with 1MWh change in wind
Name Country Year Wind share ∆PP
Nieuwenhout and Brand (2011) Netherlands 2006-2009 3% -0.008
Swinand and O’Mahoney (2015) Ireland 2008-2012 9% -0.025
Cludius et al. (2014) Germany 2008 8% -0.003
2009 8% -0.004
2010 8% -0.003
2011 10% -0.002
2012 11% -0.002
Clo` et al. (2015) Italy 2008 2% -0.011
2009 2% -0.011
2010 2% -0.008
2011 2% -0.008
2012 4% -0.006
2013 5% -0.005
This paper Ireland 2008-2012 11% -0.030
2008 8% -0.029
2009 11% -0.033
2010 10% -0.039
2011 15% -0.025
2012 15% -0.022
Wind share from Eurostat nrg105a when not available from paper.
% change in price calculated based on data provided in the papers cited.
Table C3 includes studies that calculate the marginal effect of wind on spot prices. The
units of measure vary, but we create a common measure that identifies the change in the
spot price (in €/MWh) given a 1MWh increase in wind generation. We then calculate the
size of that change with respect to the average spot price. This is what we report in the
right-most column of Table C3. The average penetration or share of wind is calculated as
the share of demand covered by wind generation and comes from each paper when it is
reported. For papers that do not report average hourly demand or average hourly wind
generation, the average penetration of wind is calculated using Eurostat data, specifically
database nrg105a and the summary information on renewables reported in the SHARES
tool (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/energy/data/shares).
Appendix D REFIT calculations
We calculate the average cost of REFIT per MWh using half-hourly information on wind
generation at the plant level, SMP and capacity payments to generators, downloaded from
the market operator’s website. We limit the analysis to wind generators in the Republic
of Ireland, since REFIT applies only to companies in Ireland.
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As stated in the main text, each plant is guaranteed a fixed price that varies by fiscal
year, which starts on October 1 and ends on September 30 (shown in Table 6). The
payment to wind generators is composed by a fixed portion (15% of the reference price
for large wind) and a portion that depends on how much the plants make on the market.
The plants receive the SMP and capacity payments from the market (wind generators did
not receive constraint payments during this period). The feed in tariff (FIT) amount is
calculated every year y for each wind generator i generating electricity Elec:
FITi,y = FixFITi,y +max[PFITy −
∑
t∈y(SMPt + CapPayi,t) · Eleci,t∑
t∈y Eleci,t
, 0] ·
∑
t∈y
Eleci,t (7)
The first term is the fixed amount and is defined as 0.15 · PFITy ·
∑
t∈y Eleci,t. The
second term shows that a positive REFIT payment is paid only if the generator does not
receive at least the REFIT price on its average sales during the year. The REFIT payment
is paid for all generation during the fiscal year in question.
Table D4 summarises the information we have for the 57 wind farms that bid directly
into the market during the January 2008 to August 2012 period. The majority of these
wind generators (49) are large, while 8 have an export capacity smaller than 5MW. These
are much fewer than the total number of wind farms that receive REFIT support. The
Electricity Act 2011 lists 118 wind farms with REFIT support, with 71 being large and
47 small.19 Small wind farms represent about 9% of total capacity, with large wind farms
responsible for the remaining 91%. We implicitly assume that all the small wind farms
have a similar generation pattern and the same for large wind farms.
In the hourly data for firms registered with the SEM there is one observation where
generation is reported as negative and one where capacity payments are negative. We set
these observations as missing.
Table D4: Summary Statistics on hourly data, 1 January 2008 to 28 August 2012
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Large wind (49 plants)
Generation (MWh) 1,504,160 7.46 9.68 0 85.03
Capacity Payments (€) 1,504,160 52.97 120.18 0 8,146.73
Capacity Payments/MWh 1,342,477 12.34 185.34 0 100,482.00
SMP (€/MWh) 1,504,166 59.40 32.34 0 695.79
Small wind (8 plants)
Generation (MWh) 192,553 0.73 0.88 0 4.61
Capacity Payments (€) 192,553 5.16 11.16 0 367.18
Capacity Payments/MWh 165,021 12.30 200.99 0 60,110.00
SMP (€/MWh) 192,553 57.70 31.34 0 695.79
Small wind farms have export capacity up to 5MW.
Data range: 1 January 2008 06:00 to 28 August 2012 23:00.
19The Electricity Regulation Act is published in Statutory Instrument No. 513 of 2011.
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The average REFIT payments by fiscal year and type of wind farm are reported in
Table D5. As expected, the average subsidy to small wind farms is larger than to large
wind farms. Note that in 2008 there was no variable REFIT paid due to the large SMP.
In general, the size of the average REFIT payment is inversely correlated with the SMP.
The average presented in the last line is weighted by the number of periods in each year,
but not by plant generation in each year.
Table D5: REFIT avg per MWh, by fiscal year, €/MWh
Large wind Small wind
Year FIT fix FIT var Tot. FIT FIT var Tot. FIT SMP
2008 9.56 0 9.56 0 9.56 83.25
2009 9.95 8.28 18.23 11.39 21.34 51.47
2010 9.95 13.56 23.51 15.71 25.66 48.78
2011 9.95 0.84 10.79 2.97 12.92 62.11
2012 10.21 2.09 12.31 5.29 15.50 61.13
Average 9.97 5.14 15.11 7.45 17.49
Avg from 2009 10.04 4.93 14.96 6.86 16.91
Data range: 1 January 2008 06:00 to 28 August 2012 23:00.
Fiscal year goes from October 1 of prior year to 30 September.
Average from 2009 is calculated from 1 November 2009.
To calculate the REFIT cost of the average MWh generated by wind under REFIT,
we weigh the average REFIT cost by the capacity share of large and small wind farms on
the system.
This leads to an average REFIT payment per MWh of 15.11 ·0.91+17.49 ·0.09 = 15.32.
To compare to other costs and benefits of wind in our analysis, we also calculate the
average REFIT payment for the period starting on November 1 2009, with a value of
14.96 · 0.91 + 16.91 · 0.09 = 15.14. This is the number that we report as the REFIT cost
of 1MWh of wind in the main text.
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